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Abstract We propose a straightforward dominance procedure for comparing
social welfare orderings (SWOs) with respect to the degree of inequality aver-
siontheyexpress.Threeversionsoftheprocedureareconsidered,eachofwhich
uses a different underlying criterion of inequality comparisons: (i) a concept
based on the Lorenz quasi-ordering, which we argue to be the ideal version,
(ii) a concept based on a minimalist criterion of inequality, and (iii) a concept
basedontherelativedifferentialsquasi-ordering.Itturnsoutthatthetraditional
Arrow–Pratt approach is equivalent to the latter two concepts for important
classes of SWOs, but that it is profoundly inconsistent with the Lorenz-based
concept. With respect to the problem of combining extreme inequality aversion
and monotonicity, concepts (ii) and (iii) identify as extremely inequality averse
a class of SWOs that includes leximin as a special case, whereas the Lorenz-
based concept (i) concludes that extreme inequality aversion and monotonicity
are incompatible.
1 Introduction
How should we compare different social preference relations over income dis-
tributions with respect to the degree of inequality aversion, i.e., the degree of
dislike towards inequality, they express? We propose a procedure for compar-
ing degrees of inequality aversion that can be loosely formulated as follows:
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Procedure ( ) A social welfare ordering (SWO) R is said to be at least as
inequality averse as an SWO R  if, for all income distributions x and y such that
x is less unequal than y according to a pre-speciﬁed inequality quasi-ordering,
(i) R strictly prefers x to y (xPy) whenever R  strictly prefers x to y (xP   y), and
(ii) R weakly prefers x to y (xIyor xPy) whenever R  is indifferent between x
and y (xI  y).
In order to make this procedure operational, an inequality quasi-ordering
must ﬁrst be chosen. This feature of Procedure ( ) makes explicit the fact that,
underlying any concept for comparing degrees of inequality aversion, there
necessarily has to be a criterion for making comparisons according to inequal-
ity—obviously, to be able to check whether an SWO expresses more or less
dislike towards inequality than another SWO, it must be clear what is meant by
inequality in the ﬁrst place. Once an inequality quasi-ordering is chosen, Pro-
cedure ( ) turns into a fully operational concept of inequality aversion which
entailsaconceptuallystraightforwardcheckfordominance:anSWOisreferred
to as at least as inequality averse as another if it implies, in all relevant choice
situations (i.e., those pairs of income distributions that are strictly ranked using
the chosen inequality quasi-ordering), an at least as inequality averse choice as
the other [as deﬁned in (i) and (ii) of Procedure ( )]. Procedure ( ) can fur-
thermore be shown to be consistent with the common approach of measuring
the degree of inequality aversion by the amount of mean income an SWO is
prepared to forego in exchange for a given decrease in inequality (see Sect. 3).
Interestingly, the traditional Arrow–Pratt concept for comparing degrees of
inequality aversion1 is a special case of Procedure ( ). Roughly speaking, the
Arrow–Pratt concept of inequality aversion is obtained in the case where the
chosen inequality quasi-ordering is the extremely simplistic one which allows
only (strict) inequality comparisons between, on the one hand, unequal income
distributions and, on the other hand, perfectly equal ones (see Sect. 4). In this
article, we take the point of view that while Procedure ( ) is the appropriate
way to approach the problem of comparing degrees of inequality aversion, the
Arrow–Pratt version of the procedure is unattractive because it is based on an
unduly restrictive inequality quasi-ordering. Taking into consideration its cen-
tral place in the literature on inequality measurement, the Lorenz inequality
quasi-orderingseemsamuchmoresuitablecandidate forthisrole.Thiscritique
of the Arrow–Pratt concept echoes that of Ross (1981) in the context of deci-
sion under risk. Ross argues that for a comparison of risk aversion between two
expected utility maximizers, it is not sufﬁcient to compare the premia they are
maximallypreparedtopayforaninsuranceagainstallrisks,astheArrow–Pratt
concept prescribes, but it is also necessary to consider premia for insurances
that decrease risk to a lower, but still risky, level. Our proposal to consider
the concept of inequality aversion based on Procedure ( ) using the Lorenz
1 The Arrow–Pratt approach is discussed thoroughly in Lambert (2001).Comparing degrees of inequality aversion 407
inequality quasi-ordering is similar to that proposed by Ross since his criterion
of decreasing risk is close to the Lorenz criterion.
Throughout the article, we will often be concerned with comparing results
yielded by, on the one hand, the version of Procedure ( ) that is equivalent
to the Arrow–Pratt concept and, on the other hand, the favoured version of
Procedure ( ) that uses the Lorenz inequality quasi-ordering. It is interest-
ing, however, to consider also a third concept that is intermediate between the
Arrow–PrattconceptandtheLorenz-basedconcept.Thisthirdconceptisbased
on the relative differentials quasi-ordering, an inequality criterion that is stron-
gerthantheminimalistinequalitycriterionunderlyingtheArrow–Prattconcept
and weaker than the Lorenz quasi-ordering (see Moyes 1994). Henceforth, we
refer to the inequality aversion concept obtained from Procedure ( ) using the
Lorenz quasi-ordering as the “L-concept,” and to that obtained from the pro-
cedure using the relative differentials quasi-ordering as the “RD-concept.”
We ﬁrst compare the three concepts of inequality aversion for the class of
continuous and monotonic SWOs, the broadest class of SWOs to which the
conventional Arrow–Pratt concept is commonly applied. We show that the
RD-concept yields the same results as the Arrow–Pratt concept if SWOs are
in addition separable, but not necessarily otherwise. Unfortunately, such con-
sistency turns out not to hold between the L-concept and the Arrow–Pratt
concept, not even with respect to the important class of constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) SWOs (a subclass of the class of continuous, monotonic,
and separable SWOs). Usually, a CES SWO with a higher value of the single
parameter, ε, is considered more inequality averse than one with a lower value
of ε. This role of ε as a measure for the degree of inequality aversion is justiﬁed
in the framework of the Arrow–Pratt concept of inequality aversion. However,
as straightforward examples show, this role of ε is not justiﬁed if the L-concept
is adopted: given two income distributions such that one is less unequal than
the other according to the Lorenz inequality quasi-ordering, it is quite possible
that a CES SWO with ε strictly prefers the less unequal income distribution,
while a CES SWO with ε  >εstrictly prefers the more unequal one. Moreover,
using a result by Ross (1981) we show that such examples can be found for any
two CES SWOs. In other words, if the L-concept is adopted, then no two CES
SWOs can be compared with respect to degree of inequality aversion.
Second, we examine the problem of reconciling the ideals of “extreme
inequality aversion” and monotonicity, i.e., the question of how to implement
theegalitarianidealofalwayschoosingforlessinequality,exceptincaseswhere
no individual would gain by doing so. We call an SWO extremely inequality
averse in a class of SWOs S if it is at least as inequality averse as all SWOs
in S (and, moreover, is itself a member of S).2 In the literature, leximin is
often seen as a typical example of an SWO that combines extreme inequality
aversion with monotonicity. We show that, in the class of monotonic SWOs,
2 The qualiﬁcation “extreme” should not be interpreted as a judgment on the ideal of egalitarian-
ism: the term simply stresses the technical point that we are dealing with the most inequality averse
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both the Arrow–Pratt concept and the RD-concept identify the entire class of
weakly maximin SWOs as extremely inequality averse—an SWO is said to be
weakly maximin if it implies a strict preference for a given income distribution
over another whenever the worst off is strictly better off in the given income
distribution. The class includes leximin and, by consequence, the Arrow–Pratt
concept and the RD-concept can be said to support the conventional view (see
also Tungodden and Vallentyne 2005). However, if the L-concept is adopted,
this view has to be abandoned: we show that in this case the set of extremely
inequality averse monotonic SWOs is empty. Finally, we demonstrate that
the incompatibility between extreme inequality aversion and monotonicity is
robust with respect to certain reasonable changes in the deﬁnition of the idea
of extreme inequality aversion.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with preliminaries. In
Sect. 3 we formally introduce and discuss the three concepts for comparing
degrees of inequality aversion that constitute the topic of the article. The ques-
tions of how the three concepts compare with respect to the class of continuous
and monotonic SWOs, and with respect to the idea of extreme inequality aver-
sion, are dealt with in Sects. 4 and 5, respectively. Some concluding remarks are
given in Sect. 6.
2 Preliminaries
An income distribution is a vector x = (x1,x2,...,xn) ∈ Rn
++ where n ≥ 3i s
the (ﬁxed) number of individuals in society and xi is the income of individ-
ual i. The set of individuals is N and the set of income distributions is X.W e
assume that, for all income distributions x ∈ X, individuals are indexed such
that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ··· ≤ xn. In accordance with this assumption, we assume that
all considered concepts for welfare and inequality comparisons satisfy ano-
nymity—that is, each income distribution is treated equivalently as all of its
rearrangements. The arithmetic mean of an income distribution x ∈ X is writ-
ten as µ(x). We use the symbol 1n to denote an n-dimensional vector of which
all components are equal to 1. For a pair of income distributions, x,y ∈ X,w e
write x > y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N with at least one strict inequality, we write
x ≯ y if x > y does not hold, and we write x   y if xi > yi for all i ∈ N.
Social preferences are represented by a social welfare ordering (SWO) R
(“is at least as good as”) on X.3 The asymmetric and symmetric parts of R are
denoted by P (“is better than”) and I (“is equally good as”), respectively. A
social welfare function is a function W : X → R that represents an SWO.
We now consider some of the axioms used in our analysis. Roughly speaking,
continuityensuresthatsmallchangesinanincomedistributioncauseonlysmall
changes in its social welfare ranking against other income distributions.
Continuity For all x ∈ X, {y|y ∈ X, yRx} and {y|y ∈ X, xRy} are closed in X.
3 An ordering is a reﬂexive, transitive, and complete binary relation.Comparing degrees of inequality aversion 409
Monotonicity says that it is an improvement if some individuals get better
off without any individuals getting worse off.
Monotonicity For all x,y ∈ X,i fx > y, then xPy.
Separability requires that the social welfare ranking of a pair of income dis-
tributions is not inﬂuenced by the incomes that are the same in both income
distributions.
Separability For all ˆ N ⊂ N and for all x,y,x ,y  ∈ X,i fxi = yi and x 
i = y 
i for
all i ∈ ˆ N, and xi = x 
i and yi = y 
i for all i ∈ N \ ˆ N, then xRy⇔ x  Ry  .
An SWO that satisﬁes continuity, monotonicity, and separability can be rep-
resented by a social welfare function of the form
W : X −→ R : x  −→ u(x1) + u(x2) +···+u(xn),( 1 )
where u : R++ → R is a continuous and strictly increasing function, referred to
as a utility function (see Bossert and Weymark 2004, Theorem 13.5). We shall
pay special attention in our analysis to the constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) class of SWOs, an important subclass of the class of continuous, mono-
tonic, and separable SWOs. An SWO Rε is said to be a member of the CES
class if there exists a nonnegative scalar ε such that Rε can be represented by
(1) with utility function u : t  → (t1−ε)/(1 − ε).
Since comparisons of income distributions with respect to inequality are con-
ceptually prior to comparisons of SWOs with respect to degree of inequality
aversion, we require the concept of an inequality quasi-ordering (IQO)   (“is
at most as unequal as”) on X.4 The asymmetric and symmetric parts of   are
denoted by ≺ (“is less unequal than”) and ∼ (“is equally unequal as”), respec-
tively.AninequalitymeasureisafunctionJ : X → Rthatrepresentsacomplete
IQO. The strongest IQO to receive broad acceptance among economists is the
Lorenz IQO. The Lorenz IQO, written as  L, is deﬁned as follows: for all
x,y ∈ X,
x  L y ⇔
x1 + x2 +···+xk
µ(x)
≥
y1 + y2 +···+yk
µ(y)
for all k = 1,2,...,n − 1.5
An IQO   will be referred to as Lorenz consistent if it agrees with all compar-
isons made by the Lorenz IQO, i.e., if ≺L ⊂≺and ∼L ⊂∼. We refer to an SWO
4 A quasi-ordering is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation.
5 For an axiomatic underpinning of the Lorenz IQO, see Foster (1985). Note that a variable
population version of the Lorenz IQO could also be deﬁned (the same is true for the minimalist
IQO and the relative differentials IQO deﬁned in Sect. 3). However, this would unnecessarily
complicate the analysis since the results we would obtain in a variable population framework are
essentially the same as those we obtain in the ﬁxed population framework adopted here.410 K. Bosmans
as Lorenz consistent if it follows the asymmetric part of the Lorenz IQO for
comparisons between income distributions with the same mean incomes.6
Lorenz consistency For all x,y ∈ X,i fµ(x) = µ(y) and x ≺L y, then xPy.
In the literature, social welfare functions are often assumed to depend on
meanincomeandinequalityonly,i.e.,itisassumedthatthereexistsaninequality
measure J and a function f : (R++ × R) → R, increasing in the ﬁrst argument
and decreasing in the second, such that W(x) = f(µ(x),J(x)) for all x ∈ X.
In that framework, Lorenz consistency is a weak requirement for SWOs—
it is sufﬁcient that the underlying inequality measure is Lorenz consistent.7
We note that all CES SWOs are Lorenz consistent and can be written as a
function of mean income and inequality. Speciﬁcally, it can be shown that each
CES SWO Rε can be represented by a social welfare function of the form
Wε : x  → µ(x)[1 − Jε(x)], where Jε is a Lorenz consistent inequality measure.8
We emphasize that our results—with the sole exception of Proposition 4 in
Sect. 5—do not assume that social welfare is a function of mean income and
inequalityonly.Tothecontrary,wedonotmakeanyassumptionsatallaboutthe
determinantsofsocialwelfare(seethediscussionattheendofSect.3).Because
the mean income-inequality representation of social welfare is popular, we will
however occasionally interpret results in that light.
3 Three concepts of inequality aversion
In this section, we deﬁne three concepts for comparing degrees of inequality
aversion based on Procedure ( ). We give a formal outline of this procedure.
First, a set is determined that contains exactly all pairs of income distribu-
tions such that one income distribution is strictly more unequal than the other
according to some “reference” IQO (clearly, this set is simply the asymmetric
partofthereferenceIQOonX).TheseareexactlyallpairsforwhicheachSWO
either implies an inequality averse choice (the less unequal income distribution
is chosen), a neutral choice (indifference), or an inequality prone choice (the
more unequal one is chosen)—three choices which can of course be unambig-
uously ranked from most inequality averse to least inequality averse. Second,
two SWOs are compared with respect to the choices implied for each of the
pairs of income distributions in the asymmetric part of the reference IQO: one
SWO is referred to as at least as inequality averse as the other if it implies an
at least as inequality averse choice for all pairs belonging to the reference set.
6 So we use the same term for two different concepts of Lorenz consistency. However, confusion
is avoided because it will always be clear from the context whether the Lorenz consistency concept
f o rI Q O so rt h a tf o rS W O si sm e a n t .
7 Note that, for a continuous, monotonic, and separable SWO R, Lorenz consistency is satisﬁed if
the following weaker criterion is satisﬁed: µ(x)1n Pxfor all x ∈ X such that x is not perfectly equal.
See Chateauneuf and Moyes (2004, Proposition 1).
8 See Atkinson (1970).Comparing degrees of inequality aversion 411
The procedure can be deﬁned formally as follows, with  A taking the role of
the reference IQO.
Deﬁnition 1 Let  A be an IQO. Let R and R  be two SWOs. Then, R is said to
be at least as A-inequality averse as R  if, for all x,y ∈ X such that x ≺A y, we
have (i) if xP  y, then xPy, and, (ii) if xI  y, then xRy.
As is conventional, we say that R is more A-inequality averse than R  if R is at
least as A-inequality averse as R  while R  is not at least as A-inequality averse
as R, and we say that R is equally A-inequality averse as R  if R is at least as
A-inequality averse as R  and R  is at least as A-inequality averse as R.
In principle, any IQO can be chosen to determine the reference set ≺A in
the outlined procedure. However, since different people may have different
reasonable views with respect to inequality comparisons, it seems preferable to
consider the common part of all these views. Now, this is exactly the role that is
often attributed to the Lorenz criterion in the literature. We argue, therefore,
that it is most appropriate to use as the set of pairs of income distributions for
whichtwoSWOsarecompared,theset≺L.Werefertotheconceptofinequality
aversion based on Deﬁnition 1 with  A equal to  L as the L-concept.
The L-concept is closely related to the concept of “strong risk aversion”
studied by Ross (1981). Ross’ concept is obtained if the L-concept is restricted
to SWOs of the expected utility form, i.e., SWOs satisfying continuity, monoto-
nicity, and separability, and if the absolute version of the Lorenz IQO is used
instead of the regular (relative) version.9
Given the broad acceptance of the Lorenz IQO, we consider the L-concept
to be the ideal concept for comparing degrees of inequality aversion, but to
allow for a stronger link with the existing literature on the topic, we consider
also two alternative concepts based on Deﬁnition 1 that will appear to be closer
to the conventional Arrow–Pratt framework (as will be shown in Sect. 4). For
theseconcepts,twoIQOsareusedthatare(weaker)alternativesfortheLorenz
IQO—that is, in both cases, in comparing two SWOs a set is considered which
is a proper subset of ≺L. The ﬁrst alternative IQO we consider is the minimalist
IQO, written as  M: for all x,y ∈ X,
x  M y ⇔ there exists a scalar e such that x = e1n.
The minimalist IQO only allows inequality comparisons between pairs of
income distributions of which at least one is perfectly equal. The second alter-
native is the relative differentials IQO, written as  RD: for all x,y ∈ X,






for all i = 1,2,...,n − 1.
9 Deﬁnition 1 has, moreover, a different phrasing than the concept of Ross (1981). Statement (ii)
of Proposition 1 and condition (2) in the proof of Lemma 2, are closer to the formulation used by
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The relative differentials IQO, which was introduced into the literature on
income distribution by Moyes (1994), says that each progressive redistribution
decreases inequality. Setting  A in Deﬁnition 1 equal to  M or  RD, we obtain
the M-concept and the RD-concept, respectively.
The M-conceptissometimesconsideredintheliteratureonriskaversion,but
in a restricted version that makes the concept applicable only to SWOs of the
expected utilityform,i.e., SWOsthat satisfycontinuity, monotonicity, and sepa-
rability. It is an established result in this context that, for SWOs of the expected
utility form, the M-concept and the Arrow–Pratt concept are equivalent.10 A
more general result will be shown to hold in Sect. 4.
Sincethethreeconceptsofinequalityaversionrelyoncomparisonsofchoices
over pairs of income distributions that are members of some set that represents
a view on inequality, ≺M, ≺RD, and ≺L, respectively, and given the fact that
≺M ⊂≺ RD ⊂≺ L,thefollowinglemmaisstraightforwardlyestablished.Westate
it without proof.
Lemma 1 Let R and R  be two SWOs. Then, of the following three statements,
(i) implies (ii), but (ii) does not imply (i), and (ii) implies (iii), but (iii) does not
imply (ii):
(i) R is at least as L-inequality averse as R ;
(ii) R is at least as RD-inequality averse as R ;
(iii) R is at least as M-inequality averse as R .
The relationships described in Lemma 1 also hold for the relation “is equally
inequality averse as,” but not for the relation “is more inequality averse than.”
Lemma 1 shows that the RD-concept is more demanding than the M-con-
cept and, in turn, the L-concept is more demanding than the RD-concept.11 A
consequence is that if, for instance, the M-concept and the L-concept yield a
different conclusion, then this disagreement will typically be of the type where
the M-concept ranks two SWOs whereas the L-concept does not. The converse
case,aswellascasesinwhichtheM-conceptandtheL-concept ranktwoSWOs
in opposite ways, are excluded by Lemma 1. In this respect, it is important to
note that if two SWOs, say R and R , are incomparable according to one of the
three concepts of inequality aversion, this does not simply mean that there is
not sufﬁcient evidence to refer to one SWO as at least as inequality averse as
the other, but, more strongly, it means that the evidence is pointing in different
directions: for some pair(s) of income distributions, R is locally more inequality
10 See, for instance, Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Proposition 6.C.2)—the restricted version of the
M-concept is close to their statement (v).
11 It is possible also to deﬁne inequality aversion concepts that are more demanding than the
L-concept—for instance, by setting  A in Deﬁnition 1 equal to the IQO that extends  L with
Kolm’s (1976) “principle of diminishing transfers,” or even by setting  A equal to a complete IQO
corresponding to a particular Lorenz consistent inequality measure. However, since the L-concept
yields impossibility results in important cases (see Theorems 2 and 4) ,t h es a m ei st r u e — af o r t i o r i —
for such more demanding concepts. In other words, for the questions raised in this article, the use of
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averse than R , while, for (an)other pair(s), R  is locally more inequality averse
than R.
Comparisons of inequality aversion are often interpreted as comparisons of
the willingness of SWOs to sacriﬁce mean income in return for a given decrease
in inequality. Since this view of inequality aversion as essentially describing a
trade-off between mean income and equality is popular, we wish to demon-
strate that the L-concept, the M-concept, and the RD-concept are consistent
with it—i.e., that these three concepts can be rephrased in terms of the mean
income-equality trade-off. The following proposition shows that according to
each of the three concepts, for all continuous and monotonic SWOs R and R ,
R is at least as inequality averse as R  if and only if, starting from any income
distribution, R accepts a move to a given lower level of inequality at a loss of at
least as much mean income as R  does.
Proposition 1 Let  A be equal to either  M,  RD,o r L. Let R and R  be
two continuous and monotonic SWOs. Then, the following two statements are
equivalent:
(i) R is at least as A-inequality averse as R ;
(ii) for all x,x ,y ∈ X such that x ∼A x  ≺A y, if xI y and x  I  y, then µ(x) ≤
µ(x ).
Proof Let  A be equal to either  M,  RD,o r L.L e tR and R  be two contin-
uous and monotonic SWOs.
(i) ⇒ (ii). Assume that (i) holds, i.e., R is at least as A-inequality averse as
R .L e tx,x ,y ∈ X be arbitrary income distributions such that x ∼A x  ≺A y,
xIy, and x  I  y. It is sufﬁcient to show that µ(x) ≤ µ(x ).L e tλ>0 be such
that λx  = x (such a λ exists because x ∼A x ). Since x  ≺A y and furthermore
(i) holds, x  I  y implies x  Ry. Since also xIy, we have x  Rxby transitivity, and
hence λ ≤ 1 by monotonicity. We obtain that µ(x) ≤ µ(x ).
(ii) ⇒ (i). Assume that (ii) holds, i.e., for all x,x ,y ∈ X such that x ∼A x  ≺A
y, xIy, and x  I  y, we have µ(x) ≤ µ(x ).L e tw,z ∈ X be arbitrary income
distributions such that w ≺A z. It is sufﬁcient to show that wP   z implies wPz
and that wI  z implies wRz. Consider ﬁrst the case where wP   z.L e tλ,λ  > 0
be such that λwIzand λ wI  z (such λ and λ  exist by continuity and mono-
tonicity). Since wP   z, we have wP   λ w by transitivity, and hence λ  < 1b y
monotonicity. Since (ii) holds, we have λ ≤ λ , and hence λ<1. We obtain
wPzfrom λwIzand λ<1 using monotonicity. The proof for the case where
wI  z is similar and therefore omitted.    
To conclude the section, we mention two reasons for preferring the elemen-
tary formulation used in Deﬁnition 1—i.e., the formulation in terms only of
preferences over pairs of income distributions—to the more traditional formu-
lation in terms of the mean income-equality trade-off. First, the formulation in
Deﬁnition 1 has the advantage that it allows application of the inequality aver-
sion concepts to all SWOs—also for instance to non-continuous SWOs, which
willbeusefulinthediscussionofextremeinequalityaversioninSect.5.Second,414 K. Bosmans
a deeper concern is that an explicit reference to a mean income-equality trade-
off may in certain cases misrepresent what comparisons of inequality aversion
are really about. In general, there is no reason why equality should be traded
off only with mean income. SWOs may express interest for other concerns, such
aspovertyalleviationforinstance—then,thetrade-offwithmeanincomeisjust
one of several trade-offs that are relevant for the idea of inequality aversion.
As the neutral formulation used in Deﬁnition 1 does not refer to any particular
trade-off, itseems tobetter capture the general essence of theidea of inequality
aversion.
4 The three concepts and the Arrow–Pratt approach
The objective of this section is to compare the conventional Arrow–Pratt con-
cept with the three concepts of inequality aversion that were presented in the
previous section. The results for the M-concept and the RD-concept are given
in Theorem 1, and the result for the L-concept is given in Theorem 2.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the Arrow–Pratt concept. The analysis of Pratt (1964) con-
cerning risk aversion has provided several equivalent concepts that can be
applied to the problem of comparing degrees of inequality aversion (see also
Lambert 2001, pp. 94–97). Some of these concepts can only be used to compare
SWOs that can be written in the expected utility form, i.e., SWOs that satisfy
continuity, monotonicity, and separability. This class is important and we shall
payattentiontoitinthissection.However,becausewewishtoinitiallyconsider
the entire class of continuous and monotonic SWOs, we focus on the strongest
of Pratt’s concepts that is applicable also to non-separable SWOs, viz., the crite-
rionbasedontheequallydistributedequivalentincome.Theequallydistributed
equivalent income for an income distribution x and an SWO R is the income,
ξR(x), that, if equally distributed, yields the same level of welfare according to
R as the income distribution x.12 Formally, for an SWO R and all x ∈ X,w e
have ξR(x) = e if and only if e1n Ix . Note that the function ξR represents the
SWO R. The Arrow–Pratt concept of inequality aversion is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 Let R and R  be two continuous and monotonic SWOs. Then, R is
said to be at least as Arrow–Pratt inequality averse as R  if ξR(x) ≤ ξR (x) for all
x ∈ X.13
The “more inequality averse than” and “equally inequality averse as” rela-
tions corresponding to the Arrow–Pratt concept are deﬁned in the same way as
for the inequality aversion concept of Deﬁnition 1.
According to the Arrow–Pratt concept, an SWO in the CES class is more
inequalityaverseasthevalueofitscorrespondingε isgreater.14 Forthisreason,
12 See Atkinson (1970)a n dKolm (1969).
13 Note that the Arrow–Pratt concept compares, for all income distributions, how much sacriﬁce
of mean income SWOs maximally allow in order to move from a given income distribution to a per-
fectly equal one—for an SWO R and an income distribution x, this sacriﬁce equals [µ(x) − ξR(x)].
14 In fact, ε is the value of the relative Arrow–Pratt measure of risk/inequality aversion.Comparing degrees of inequality aversion 415
ε is traditionally interpreted as being a parameter of inequality aversion for the
CES class. A word of caution is in order here. The parameter ε plays a dou-
ble role in the CES class: besides being a parameter of inequality aversion
in the Arrow–Pratt sense, it is also a parameter that measures the sensitivity
of an SWO to inequality in the bottom of the income distribution relative to
inequality in the top. Whereas the concepts of inequality aversion and bottom
sensitivity are very different in general, they happen to coincide in the case of
the CES class (see Cowell 1985).15 When later in this section the parameter
ε is discussed, it is discussed as a parameter of inequality aversion, not as a
parameter of bottom sensitivity.
Although we are most interested in the L-concept for the reason speciﬁed in
Sect. 3, it is convenient for expositional purposes to start with the comparison
of the Arrow–Pratt concept with the M-concept and RD-concept. These con-
cepts turn out to be closer to the Arrow–Pratt concept than the L-concept is.
The following theorem summarizes the relationships between the Arrow–Pratt
concept, the M-concept, and the RD-concept.
Theorem 1 Let R and R  be two continuous and monotonic SWOs. Consider the
following three statements:
(i) R is at least as Arrow–Pratt inequality averse as R ;
(ii) R is at least as M-inequality averse as R ;
(iii) R is at least as RD-inequality averse as R .
We have that
(a) statements (i) and (ii) are equivalent;
(b) statement (iii) implies statement (i), but statement (i) does not imply state-
ment (iii);
(c) if, in addition, R and R  are separable, then statements (i), (ii), and (iii) are
equivalent.
Proof Let R and R  be two continuous and monotonic SWOs.
We ﬁrst prove statement (a) of the theorem.
(i) ⇒ (ii). Assume that (i) holds, i.e., ξR(x) ≤ ξR (x) for all x ∈ X.L e t
w,z ∈ X be arbitrary income distributions such that w ≺M z. It is sufﬁcient
to show that wP   z implies wPz and that wI  z implies wIz. Consider ﬁrst
the case where wP   z. We have ξR (w)>ξ R (z). Since w ≺M z, we have fur-
thermore w = ξR(w)1n = ξR (w)1n. Since also ξR (z) ≥ ξR(z) by (i), we have
ξR(w)>ξ R(z),andweobtainwPz.TheproofforthecasewherewI  zissimilar
and therefore omitted.
(ii) ⇒ (i). Assume that (ii) holds, i.e., R is at least as M-inequality averse as
R .L e tx ∈ X be an arbitrary income distribution. It is sufﬁcient to show that
15 While the concept of inequality aversion is typically related to comparisons of income distribu-
tions with different means (see the discussion of Proposition 1 in Sect. 3), the concept of bottom
sensitivity is related to comparisons of income distributions with the same means (see Cowell 1985,
p. 569). Unfortunately, bottom sensitivity is often also referred to as “inequality aversion” in the
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ξR(x) ≤ ξR (x). We have ξR (x)1n I  x by deﬁnition. If ξR (x)1n ∼M x, then we
have ξR(x) = ξR (x).I fξR (x)1n ≺M x, then ξR (x)1n I  x implies ξR (x)1n Rxby
(ii). Since also ξR(x)1n Ixby deﬁnition, we have ξR (x)1n RξR(x)1n by transitiv-
ity. We obtain ξR(x) ≤ ξR (x) by monotonicity.
Next, we prove statement (b) of the theorem.
(iii) ⇒ (i). This follows from statement (a) of the theorem and Lemma 1.
(i)   (iii). We consider an example where R is at least as Arrow–Pratt
inequality averse as R , but R is not at least as RD-inequality averse as R .L e t
the equally distributed equivalent incomes (i.e., social welfare functions) for R
and R  be given by
ξR : x  −→
7x1 + 2x2 + w3x3 + w4x4 +···+wn−1xn−1 + xn
10 + w3 + w4 +···+wn−1
,
and
ξR  : x  −→
5x1 + 4x2 + w3x3 + w4x4 +···+wn−1xn−1 + xn
10 + w3 + w4 +···+wn−1
,
respectively,wherew3,w4,...,wn−1 arepositivescalars(thesameforRandR ).
We have ξR(x) ≤ ξR (x) for all x ∈ X, and hence R is at least as Arrow–Pratt
inequalityaverseasR .Now ,letx,y ∈ X besuchthat(x1,x2,xn) = (15,250,260),
(y1,y2,yn) = (10,200,400), and xi = yi = 255 for all i = 3,4,...,n−1. We have
x ≺RD y, yPx, and xP   y, and hence R is not at least as RD-inequality averse
as R .
The proof of statement (c) of the theorem is given in an appendix.    
We mentioned in the previous section that the M-concept and the Arrow–
Pratt concept are equivalent for continuous, monotonic, and separable SWOs.
As statement (a) of Theorem 1 shows, this equivalence also holds without sep-
arability. This result is not very surprising, given the fact that the deﬁnitions of
boththeM-conceptandtheArrow–Prattconceptrefertopreferencesoverpairs
of income distributions of which one is perfectly equal. Statement (b) shows
that, if we take the step from the minimalist IQO to the relative differentials
IQO as the underlying inequality criterion for the concept of inequality aver-
sion,thenwemoveawayfromconvention.TheinconsistencyoftheRD-concept
andtheArrow–PrattconceptconsistsoftherebeingSWOssuchthattheArrow–
Pratt concept ranks them while the RD-concept does not. Finally, statement (c)
shows that the RD-concept and the Arrow–Pratt concept agree on how to rank
any pair of SWOs of the expected utility form.
With respect to the M-concept and the RD-concept we may conclude that
the former, and to a lesser extent the latter, support the claims made tradi-
tionally in the literature on the basis of the Arrow–Pratt concept. An impor-
tant question we now turn to is whether the favoured L-concept is consistent
with these claims. We already know, by Lemma 1 and statement (b) of Theo-
rem1,thattheL-conceptandtheArrow–Prattconceptcannotbeequivalentfor
the entire class of monotonic and continuous SWOs, so the question becomes
whetherthisequivalenceholdsfortheexpectedutilityclassofSWOs(asfortheComparing degrees of inequality aversion 417
RD-concept), or at least for the popular CES subclass. This appears not to be
the case. There are several pairs of CES SWOs Rε and Rε  such that ε>ε  , and
several pairs of income distributions x,y ∈ X such that x ≺L y,f o rw h i c hw e
have yP ε x while xP ε  y. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1 The example is for the case n = 3. Take the income distributions
x = (19,57,76) and y = (20,20,130). We have x ≺L y. However, for all CES
SWOs with ε such that 0.403 <ε<14.513, we have xP ε y, while for all CES
SWOs with ε>14.514, we have yP ε x.16
Using a result by Ross (1981) it is possible to draw even stronger conclusions
with respect to the CES class. Ross’ critique of the Arrow–Pratt framework can
be interpreted as a confrontation of the L-concept and the M-concept in the
framework of expected utility theory. The following lemma is based on one of
his results.
Lemma 2 Let Ru and Rv be two continuous, monotonic, and separable SWOs
such that the respective corresponding utility functions, u and v, are three times
differentiable and concave. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) Ru is at least as L-inequality averse as Rv;
(ii) there exist a non-increasing and concave function f : R++ → R and a
scalar λ>0 such that u(t) = λv(t) + f(t) for all t ∈ R++.
Proof Let Ru and Rv be two continuous, monotonic, and separable SWOs such
that the respective corresponding utility functions, u and v, are three times
differentiable and concave.
Ross (1981, Theorem 3) shows that (ii) is equivalent to the following condi-
tion: for all x,y ∈ X such that µ(x) = µ(y) and x ≺L y,i f(x − πu1n)Iu y and
(x − πv1n)Iv y, then πu ≥ πv. Inspection of Ross’ proof reveals that (ii) is also
equivalent to the following similar condition:
for all x,y ∈ X such that µ(x) = µ(y) and x ≺L y,i f γuxI u y and γvxI v y,
then γu ≤ γv.( 2 )
What remains to be shown is that the condition in (2) is equivalent to (i). First
we show that (2) is equivalent to
for all x,x ,y ∈ X such that x ∼L x  ≺L y,i fxI u y and x  Iv y, then µ(x) ≤ µ(x ).
(3)
It is immediate that (3) implies (2). That (2)i m p l i e s( 3) follows from the fact
that if there exist x,x ,y ∈ X such that x ∼L x  ≺L y, xI u y and x  Iv y, then
16 Note that we have µ(x)<µ ( y) in the example. This is no coincidence since if we would have
µ(x) ≥ µ(y) and x ≺L y, then all CES SWOs would strictly prefer x over y, as can be easily
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there exists a z ∈ X such that µ(y) = µ(z) and scalars γu,γv such that x = γuz
and x  = γvz. Now, since (3) is equivalent to (i) by Proposition 1, the required
result follows.    
It can be shown now that in the entire class of CES SWOs there are no two
SWOs that can be compared using the L-concept of inequality aversion.
Theorem 2 Let Rε and Rε  be two CES SWOs such that ε  = ε . Then, Rε and Rε 
areincomparableaccordingtotheL-concept,i.e.,Rε isnotatleastasL-inequality
averse as Rε , and Rε  is not at least as L-inequality averse as Rε.
Proof LetRε andRε  beCESSWOssuchthatε  = ε .Withoutlossofgenerality,
let ε>ε  .
Since ε>ε  , Rε is more M-inequality averse than Rε . Hence, Rε  is not at
least as L-inequality averse as Rε by Lemma 1. What remains to be shown is
that Rε is not at least as L-inequality averse as Rε . Seeking a contradiction,
assumethatRε isatleastasL-inequalityaverseasRε .Then,byLemma2,there






1 − ε  + f(t) for all t ∈ R++.
Non-increasingness and concavity of f imply
df(t)
dt
= t−ε − λt−ε 
≤ 0 for all t ∈ R++,( 4 )
and
df2(t)
dt2 =− εt−(1+ε) + λε t−(1+ε ) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ R++.( 5 )
From (4) and (5)i tf o l l o w st h a t




ε t−(ε−ε ) for all t ∈ R++,( 7 )
respectively. Since the functions t  → t−(ε−ε ) and t  → (ε/ε )t−(ε−ε ) map R++
onto R++, there exist s,t ∈ R++ such that s−(ε−ε ) >( ε / ε  )t−(ε−ε ). By conse-
quence, λ cannot satisfy both (6) and (7) and we have a contradiction.    
The CES class of SWOs is often considered to be very useful in practice
because, according to the conventional Arrow–Pratt approach, it encompasses
acontinuumofpositionswithrespecttoinequalityaversionfromthecompletely
non-egalitarian mean income rule (ε = 0) to leximin (ε →∞ ), which is often
viewed as constituting the extreme case of inequality aversion (see Sect. 5). The
class owes its popularity furthermore to the fact that it has attractive proper-
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continuity, monotonicity, and separability, and allow a natural decomposition
into mean income and a Lorenz consistent inequality measure as explained in
Sect.2.However,thedeepinconsistencybetween,ontheonehand,theconven-
tional interpretation of the parameter ε and, on the other hand, the L-concept
may be seen as somewhat damaging for the CES class to operate as a canonical
class of SWOs. The problem is aggravated by the fact that all members of the
CES class ascribe importance to the Lorenz IQO—and thus the L-concept—
because they are all Lorenz consistent. Is it possible to ﬁnd another class of
SWOs which both has attractive properties and encompasses a continuum of
degrees of inequality aversion according to the L-concept? Although we shall
not attempt to answer this question here, we wish to note that a sacriﬁce will
have to be made irrespective of the direction in which an answer is sought.
For instance, the analysis of Ross (1981) can be used to construct a class of
SWOs to play a role similar to that of the CES class, in which case continuity,
monotonicity, and separability will still be satisﬁed. However, it may possibly
be seen as a drawback that in that case the natural link between welfare and an
underlyingcriterionof(Lorenzconsistent)inequalitywillbelost.Alternatively,
such a natural link can be taken as a starting point to construct an alternative
to the CES class, but at the cost of separability. 17
5 Extreme inequality aversion
In this section, we characterize, for each of the three concepts proposed in
Sect. 3, the classes of SWOs that reconcile monotonicity with an extreme form
of inequality aversion.18 The results for the M-concept and the RD-concept are
given in Theorem 3, and the result for the L-concept is given in Theorem 4.
Conventionally, maximin and leximin are seen as typical examples of
extremely inequality averse SWOs. Both SWOs give absolute priority to the
worst off. Maximin furthermore implies indifference in all cases in which the
worst off is equally well off, i.e., an SWO R is called maximin if, for all x,y ∈ X,
we have xRy ⇔ x1 ≥ y1. Leximin, on the other hand, gives priority to the
second worst off in the cases where the worst off is equally well off in both
alternatives, and so on, i.e., an SWO R is called leximin if, for all x,y ∈ X,w e
have
xRy ⇔ either x = y, or, there is an integer k such that
xi = yi for all i < k, and xk > yk.
Maximin and leximin are both members of the class of weakly maximin SWOs,
which is the class of SWOs that have in common the asymmetric part of maxi-
min, i.e., an SWO R is called weakly maximin if, for all x,y ∈ X, we have that
if x1 > y1, then xPy. It can be shown that maximin is the only continuous
17 See Champernowne and Cowell (1998, pp. 107–108) on a similar point.
18 How the ideals of extreme inequality aversion and monotonicity can be combined is an impor-
tant question in egalitarian social ethics. See Tungodden (2003, pp. 10–23) for an overview of the
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member of the class of weakly maximin SWOs and that leximin is the only sep-
arable member of the class. It will be of interest to see what role leximin plays
in our analysis, since it is the only popular SWO that is commonly viewed as
combining extreme inequality aversion with monotonicity—maximin, by con-
trast, does not satisfy monotonicity.
The starting point of our analysis is the following deﬁnition of the idea of
extreme inequality aversion.
Deﬁnition 3 Let S be a class of SWOs. An SWO R is said to be extremely
inequality averse in S if R is a member of S and R is at least as inequality averse
as each member of S.
This deﬁnition assures that an extremely inequality averse SWO in S never
implies a choice over a pair of income distributions that is less inequality averse
than that implied by any other member of S. Note also that all extremely
inequality averse SWOs are equally inequality averse.
Inwhatfollows,weidentifythemembersoftheclassofmonotonicSWOsthat
are extremely inequality averse according to the M-concept, the RD-concept,
and the L-concept. Since we do not require continuity, the standard Arrow–
Pratt concept cannot be applied in this context—however, it is natural to inter-
pret the M-concept as being the evident extension of the Arrow–Pratt concept
capable of such comparisons. Again, it is convenient to begin the analysis by
considering the M-concept and the RD-concept.
Theorem 3 Let R be a monotonic SWO. Then, the following ﬁve statements are
equivalent:
(i) R is extremely M-inequality averse in the class of monotonic SWOs;
(ii) R is extremely RD-inequality averse in the class of monotonic SWOs;
(iii) for all x,y ∈ X such that x ≮ y, we have that if x ≺M y, then xPy;
(iv) for all x,y ∈ X such that x ≮ y, we have that if x ≺RD y, then xPy;
(v) R is weakly maximin.
Proof Let R be a monotonic SWO.
(i) ⇔ (iii).Firstweshowthat(i)implies(iii).Seekingacontradiction,assume
that (i) holds while (iii) does not. Let x,y ∈ X be arbitrary income distribu-
tions such that x ≮ y, x ≺M y, and yRx (such x and y exist since (iii) does
not hold). Let R  be an arbitrary monotonic SWO such that xP   y (such an R 
exists since x ≮ y). Since x ≺M y, yRx, and xP   y, we have that R is not at
least as M-inequality averse as R , which contradicts (i). That (iii) implies (i) is
immediate.
(iii) ⇔ (v). First we show that (iii) implies (v). Seeking a contradiction,
assume that (iii) holds while (v) does not. Let x,y ∈ X be arbitrary income
distributions such that x1 > y1 and yRx (such x and y exist since R is not
weakly maximin). Reﬂexivity and monotonicity imply that xRx 11n. Since also
yRx,wehaveyRx 11n bytransitivity.Sincex1 > y1,wehavex11n ≮ yandsince
R is monotonic, yRx 11n implies x11n ≺M y. We have yRx 11n while x11n ≮ y
and x11n ≺M y, which contradicts (iii). Second we show that (v) implies (iii).Comparing degrees of inequality aversion 421
Assume that (v) holds. Let x,y ∈ X be arbitrary income distributions such that
x ≺M y and x ≮ y. It is sufﬁcient to show that xPy.N o w ,x ≺M y implies
x = x11n, and x11n ≮ y implies x1 > y1. Since R is weakly maximin, we have
xPy.
(ii) ⇔ (iv). The proof is similar to that of the equivalence of (i) and (iii) and
is therefore omitted.
(iv) ⇔ (v). First we show that (iv) implies (v). Since ≺M ⊂≺ RD, (iv) implies
(iii). Since also (iii) implies (v), the required result follows. Second we show
that (v) implies (iv). Assume that (v) holds. Let x,y ∈ X be arbitrary income
distributions such that x ≮ y and x ≺RD y. It is sufﬁcient to show that xPy.
Because x ≮ y, there exists an i ∈ N such that xi/yi > 1. Since furthermore
x ≺RD y, we have x1/y1 > 1. Hence, we have xPysince R is weakly maximin.
   
The equivalence of (i) and (v) in Theorem 3 says that the case of extreme
M-inequality aversion in the class of monotonic SWOs is covered by the mono-
tonic weakly maximin SWOs. To a certain extent, this result supports the con-
ventional view that leximin constitutes the case of extreme inequality aversion.
ThereasonisthattheliteraturefocusesvirtuallyexclusivelyonseparableSWOs
when studying extreme inequality aversion, combined with the fact that lexi-
min is the only separable weakly maximin SWO.19 The ﬁnding that (i) and (v)
are equivalent is important for two reasons. Firstly, given Lemma 1, it follows
from this result that the classes of extremely inequality averse SWOs that are
implied by the RD-concept and the L-concept must be subsets of the class of
monotonic weakly maximin SWOs. Secondly, it presents another way of seeing
why the M-concept is unattractive. As an illustration of this point, consider the
following SWO R: for all x,y ∈ X, we have that
if x1 > y1, then xPy, and if x1 = y1, then xRy⇔ µ(x) ≥ µ(y).
This SWO is both monotonic and weakly maximin. Now note that whenever
two income distributions have the same lowest incomes, this SWO ranks them
according to the completely non-egalitarian mean income rule.20 Probably,
many would hesitate to refer to such an SWO as extremely inequality averse,
thus implicitly accepting that the M-concept is too undemanding as a criterion
for comparing degrees of inequality aversion. However, as the equivalence of
(ii) and (v) shows, moving on to the more demanding RD-concept does not
19 The interpretation of leximin as being extremely inequality averse can be defended on the basis
of the Arrow–Pratt concept. Hammond (1975) has demonstrated that leximin can be interpreted
as the limit case, ε →∞ , of the CES class of SWOs, a point which Lambert (2001, Theorem 4.4)
has generalized with respect to the entire class of continuous, monotonic, and separable SWOs. In
Bosmans (2007), it is shown that using an approach analogous to that of Hammond and Lambert,
the weakly maximin class can be identiﬁed as extremely inequality averse on the basis of the
Arrow–Pratt concept if separability is dropped. Theorem 3 conﬁrms the latter result.
20 Note that the comparison of such income distributions is probably even quite common in
practice—think of a change in the tax system that leaves the existing minimally guaranteed income
unaffected.422 K. Bosmans
solve anything: the class of monotonic weakly maximin SWOs is still identiﬁed
as the extremely inequality averse subclass of the class of monotonic SWOs.
Before we consider which monotonic weakly maximin SWOs survive the test of
Deﬁnition 3 when we move to the L-concept, we consider the other statements
of Theorem 3.
The conditions expressed in statements (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 3 constitute
a natural way of giving meaning to extreme inequality aversion for SWOs that
satisfy monotonicity—the conditions say that one should prefer, for any pair of
income distributions, the one which is less unequal (according to the minimalist
IQOandtherelativedifferentialsIQOinstatements(iii)and(iv),respectively)
unlesstheincomedistributionisworseforsomeandbetterfornone.Inarecent
study on the possibility of combining extreme inequality aversion and monoto-
nicity, Tungodden and Vallentyne (2005) have taken natural conditions as those
expressed in statements (iii) and (iv) as a starting point (so, relying only implic-
itly on the concepts deﬁned in our Deﬁnitions 1 and 3). They have considered
a condition similar to that of statement (iii) and also show that statements (iii)
and (v) are equivalent. Later, we draw a more interesting parallel between the
present work and theirs.
Now, we come to the important question of which SWOs are extremely
inequality averse according to the L-concept. Note ﬁrst that while the
M-concept and the RD-concept identify all weakly maximin SWOs as
extremely inequality averse, according to the L-concept no member of this
class is extremely inequality averse.
Proposition 2 Let R be a continuous and monotonic SWO satisfying Lorenz
consistency. Then, there exist x,y ∈ Xf o rw h i c hx≺L y, such that we have xPy
while all weakly maximin SWOs strictly prefer y to x.
Proof Let R be a continuous and monotonic SWO satisfying Lorenz consis-
tency. Let y ∈ X be an arbitrary income distribution such that y1 ≤ y2 < y3.L e t
xλ = (λy1,λt,λt,...,λt) be an n-dimensional vector with t =
n
i=2 yi/(n − 1)
and λ a positive scalar. Note that xλ ∈ X and xλ ≺L y for all allowed values of λ.
Ifλ = 1, then xλ Pyby Lorenz consistency. Hence, continuity and monotonicity
imply that there exist values of λ such that 0 <λ<1 and xλ Py. Now, for all
such values of λ, we have λy1 < y1 and hence that y is strictly preferred to xλ
by all weakly maximin SWOs.    
Proposition 2 demonstrates that, given the L-concept, the weakly maximin
SWOs do not only fail the test of extreme inequality aversion described in
Deﬁnition 3, they do so in a particularly bad way. The proposition says that, for
instance,itispossibletoﬁndapairofincomedistributionssuchthataCESSWO
with ε arbitrarily close to, but greater than, zero, and hence arbitrarily close to
the completely non-egalitarian mean income rule, is locally more inequality
averse than all weakly maximin SWOs for this pair. Because each extremely
L-inequality averse SWO in the class of monotonic SWOs must be weakly
maximin by Lemma 1 and Theorem 3, the following result follows immediately
from Proposition 2.Comparing degrees of inequality aversion 423
Theorem 4 There is no SWO that is extremely L-inequality averse in the class of
monotonic SWOs.
So, we conclude that if we accept the L-concept, then extreme inequal-
ity aversion is incompatible with monotonicity. In their work, Tungodden and
Vallentyne (2005) reach a similar conclusion. However, they implicitly use a
criterion that lies in between the M-concept and the RD-concept, and ﬁnd an
incompatibility.21 This is possible because they use a slightly (but signiﬁcantly)
different framework than the one used here: their result is driven by the fact
that they reject anonymity as a property of SWOs, but accept it for IQOs.
The present study shows that without this assumption, there is no incompati-
bility between their version of extreme inequality aversion and monotonicity
(this is implied by the equivalence of (ii) and (v) in Theorem 3), but that the
incompatibility crops up again when the L-concept is accepted (Theorem 4).22
WhatshouldegalitarianswhoagreewiththeL-conceptandwantbothmono-
tonicity and extreme inequality aversion choose as an SWO? It might at ﬁrst
glance seem natural to regard leximin or other monotonic weakly maximin
SWOs as being “close enough”—these SWOs satisfy a necessary condition
for being extremely inequality averse (they are extremely inequality averse if
one looks only at the pairs in ≺M or ≺RD), and a sufﬁcient condition cannot
be satisﬁed (being extremely inequality averse for those in ≺L is impossible),
hence why not content ourselves with these? Proposition 2 illustrates already
how unattractive it is to settle for a conclusion based on the less demanding
M-concept and RD-concept if the L-concept is the one which is deemed ideal.
There is also a deeper reason for extreme egalitarians not to (necessarily) focus
on the class of weakly maximin SWOs. It is perfectly acceptable to consider
the pairs ordered by the minimalist IQO (i.e., the set ≺M) as not being more
important than some alternative set of pairs ordered by the Lorenz IQO (i.e.,
a subset of ≺L which differs from ≺M). If one accepts the Lorenz IQO, these
former pairs of income distributions are not special in any way. If such an alter-
native set of pairs is used in a criterion for comparing degrees of inequality
aversion, in accordance with the explanation at the beginning of Sect. 3, then
the set of extremely inequality averse monotonic SWOs need not be empty, nor
contain any weakly maximin SWOs. For instance, if the income distributions
from Example 1 are members of this alternative set, then none of the weakly
maximin SWOs pass the test of extreme inequality aversion of Deﬁnition 3,
while (depending on the other elements of the set) other SWOs may pass the
test.
To conclude the section, we consider two alternative ways of giving meaning
to the view that inequality reduction should always be preferred unless no one
21 More precisely, they use a condition similar to that stated in statements (iii) and (iv) of The-
orem 3, but with, instead of the minimalist or relative differentials IQO, an IQO that is a proper
subrelation of the relative differentials IQO and a proper superrelation of the minimalist IQO.
22 In Tungodden (2000) it is also shown that, without rejecting anonymity, their extreme inequality
aversion condition and monotonicity are compatible.424 K. Bosmans
gains by it. However, as we shall see, neither alternative produces a convincing
way out of the incompatibility.
The ﬁrst alternative is to consider the SWOs for which no monotonic SWO
is more inequality averse according to the L-concept, instead of the ones that
are at least as inequality averse as all the other monotonic ones according to
the L-concept (as in Deﬁnition 3). Consider the following deﬁnition of this
alternative concept of “maximal inequality aversion.”
Deﬁnition 4 Let S be a class of SWOs. An SWO R is said to be maximally
inequality averse in S if R is a member of S and no member of S is more
inequality averse than R.23
The subset of maximally L-inequality averse SWOs in the class of monotonic
SWOs is not empty: as the following proposition shows, at least leximin is a
member.
Proposition 3 Leximin is maximally L-inequality averse in the class of mono-
tonic SWOs.
Proof It is sufﬁcient to show that there does not exist a monotonic SWO R
that is more L-inequality averse than leximin. Seeking a contradiction, assume
that such an R does exist. Let x,y ∈ X be such that x ≺L y, xRy, and leximin
strictly prefers y to x. Since leximin strictly prefers y to x, there exists a k > 1
such that xi = yi for all i = 1,2,...,k − 1, and xk < yk.L e tz ∈ X be such that
zi = xi = yi for all i = 1,2,...,k − 1, xk < zk < min{
n
i=k xi/(n − k + 1),yk},
and zi = zk for all i = k+1,k+2,...,n. Monotonicity implies yPz. Since also
xRy, we have xPzby transitivity. Now, z ≺L x and leximin strictly prefers z
to x. By consequence, R is not more L-inequality averse than leximin and we
have a contradiction.    
However, the concept of maximal inequality aversion seems too undemand-
ing, because it is not excluded that there are SWOs, which are themselves
unlikely candidates for being considered extremely inequality averse, that are
more inequality averse for at least some pairs of income distributions—in the
case of leximin, Proposition 2 should sufﬁce to make this point.
A second alternative is to start from the view that SWOs are functions of
an underlying inequality measure or IQO, a view not uncommon in the lit-
erature as we saw in Sect. 2. In that perspective, the following approach to
combining monotonicity and an absolute preference for inequality reduction
seems reasonable: choose an SWO that, for all pairs of income distributions to
which monotonicity applies, follows monotonicity, and, for all pairs to which
monotonicity does not apply, prefers the income distribution which minimizes
inequality according to some IQO (or some inequality measure). Note that
this approach does not require a complete IQO since the IQO need not order
23 The distinction between extreme inequality aversion and maximal inequality aversion is analo-
gous to the distinction made by Sen (1997) between optimization and maximization in individual
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pairs of income distributions to which monotonicity applies—it does have to
order all pairs to which monotonicity does not apply, however. The question
is whether it is possible to ﬁnd an SWO and a corresponding IQO that satisfy
the required condition. First we need to consider some minimal criteria that a
“sensible” IQO ought to satisfy. The ﬁrst is that it should have the minimalist
IQO as a subrelation. The second is that it satisﬁes some invariance criterion.
An invariance criterion deﬁnes the transformation that if applied to all incomes
leavesinequalityinvariant.Forinstance,theinvariancecriterionunderlyingthe
Lorenz IQO and the relative differentials IQO is scale invariance, which says:
for all x ∈ X and all scalars λ>0, we have x ∼ λx. However, we will demand
only that a much weaker invariance criterion is satisﬁed. Minimal invariance
says that for any given income distribution there must exist an income distribu-
tion in which everyone is better off and which is at least as unequal as the given
income distribution.
Minimal invariance For all x ∈ X, there is an x  ∈ X such that x    x and
x   x .
The following proposition shows that no SWO and IQO with the described
properties exist.
Proposition 4 Let R be a monotonic SWO. Let   be an IQO that satisﬁes min-
imal invariance and for which ≺⊃≺ M. Then, the following condition is not
satisﬁed: for all x,y ∈ X such that x ≮ y, we have x ≺ y ⇔ xPy.
Proof Let R be a monotonic SWO. Let   be an IQO that satisﬁes minimal
invariance and for which ≺⊃≺ M. Seeking a contradiction, assume that the
condition stated in the proposition is satisﬁed. The condition implies statement
(i) of Theorem 3 since ≺⊃≺ M. Hence, R is weakly maximin by Theorem 3.L e t
x ∈ X be an arbitrary income distribution such that x1 < x2 < x3.L e tx  ∈ X
be an arbitrary income distribution such that x    x and x   x  (such an x 
exists by minimal invariance). Now consider a y ∈ X such that x1 < y1 < x 
1,
y2 < x2 < x 
2, and x3 < x 
3 < y3. Since R is weakly maximin, we have yPxand
x  Py. By the condition stated in the proposition, y ≮ x and yPximply y ≺ x,
and x  ≮ y and x  Pyimply x  ≺ y. Since x  ≺ y and y ≺ x, we have x  ≺ x by
transitivity, which contradicts x   x .    
Proposition 1 says that, no matter which (“sensible”) IQO is considered, the
following is true: each monotonic SWO (so also leximin and each of the other
monotonic weakly maximin SWOs) will for some pairs of income distributions
choosetheincomedistributionthatisnottheleastunequalofthetwoaccording
to the given IQO, and this without this choice being directly imposed on the
SWO by monotonicity.
6 Concluding remarks
In this article, we studied a straightforward dominance procedure for compar-
ing SWOs with respect to degree of inequality aversion. We considered three426 K. Bosmans
versions of the procedure based on three inequality criteria: (i) the L-concept,
which we argued to be the ideal version, (ii) the M-concept, which is roughly
equivalent to the traditional Arrow–Pratt approach, and (iii) the RD-concept,
which is intermediate in strength between the other two concepts.
It was shown that the L-concept is in general incompatible with the
M-concept. In the case of the CES class of SWOs, the difference between the
conclusions produced by the two concepts was especially pronounced: whereas
the M-concept ranks all members of this class, the L-concept ranks none. As
we have said already, it would be interesting to think about theoretically agree-
able alternatives to the CES class of which the members can be ranked using
the L-concept and which covers a wide spectrum of positions with respect to
inequality aversion. Probably, the most attractive solution is to give up sepa-
rability and to consider classes of SWOs such as, for instance, that given by
Wα : x  → µ(x)[1 − J(x)]α, where J is a Lorenz consistent inequality measure:
here α is a parameter that measures inequality aversion in accordance with the
L-concept. It may be interesting to see whether classes of SWOs in the spirit
of this example can be constructed in a theoretically and philosophically sound
way starting directly from the idea of the natural decomposition of welfare in
mean income and inequality.
We showed, furthermore, that if we accept the L-concept, then monotonicity
and extreme inequality aversion are incompatible. Hence, egalitarians commit-
ted to monotonicity have to content themselves with being less than extremely
inequality averse: it is always possible to ﬁnd pairs of income distributions for
which a less inequality averse choice than possible must be made. Those who
are attracted to both the ideals of monotonicity and extreme inequality aver-
sion have to determine which of the two to weaken. We have discussed that if
extremeinequalityaversionisweakened,nothingforcesonetooptforaweakly
maximin SWO such as leximin. It is perfectly possible to choose a different set
over which one wants to make inequality averse choices than the set that forces
one to give full priority to the worst off. The other possibility, not yet discussed,
is to weaken monotonicity. For instance, a possibility is to demand only ray-
monotonicity: for all x ∈ X and all λ>1, we have λxPx. It can easily be shown
that there exist SWOs that are extremely inequality averse according to the
L-concept in the class of ray-monotonic SWOs.24 Interestingly, not only does
the weakening to ray-monotonicity make it possible to have extremely inequal-
ity averse SWOs, but none of them is weakly maximin (and this is true even if
we use the M-concept instead of the L-concept). In other words, whichever of
the two ideals egalitarians choose to weaken in order to deal with the incom-
patibility, they should not feel required to restrict their consideration to leximin
or other weakly maximin SWOs.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1, statement (c) Let Ru and Rv be two continuous, mono-
tonic, and separable SWOs with u and v as the respective corresponding utility
functions. Let Ru be at least as Arrow–Pratt inequality averse as Rv. Given
statements (a) and (b) of Theorem 1, it is sufﬁcient to show that Ru is at least as
RD-inequality averse as Rv.L e tx,y ∈ X be arbitrary income distributions such
that x ≺RD y. We have to show that xP v y implies xP u y and that xI v y implies
xR u y.I fx > y or y > x, then the required conclusion follows immediately from
monotonicity. Therefore, we assume that neither x > y nor y > x holds.
We now construct an income distribution y , which differs from x in at most
one component and which is such that y  Iv y. We use the following algorithm
to transform y into y . In each step except the last, at least one component
not equal to the corresponding one in x is replaced by the component from
x. Hence, there is a ﬁnite number of steps, say m.L e tk ≥ 1 and   ≤ n be
the elements of N such that xi > yi for all i = 1,2,...,k, xi = yi for all
i = k + 1,k + 2,...,  − 1, and xi < yi for all i =  ,  + 1,...,n. Such k and  
existbecausex ≺RD y,whileneitherx > y,nory > x.Moreover,wehavek <  .
Step s = 1,2,...,m:L e ty0 = y.L e tys−1 be the income distribution resulting
from the previous step if s = 2,3,...,m.I fys−1 differs from x in at most one
component, then the algorithm ends and y  = ys−1. Else, income distribution
ys is constructed from ys−1 by replacing the components corresponding to arbi-
trary i,j ∈ N such that i ≤ k < ≤ j. Note that we have ys−1
i < xi < xj < ys−1
j .
The vector ys is constructed as follows:
• if v(xi) + v(xj) = v(ys−1
i ) + v(ys−1
j ), then ys is equal to ys−1 with the ith
component replaced by xi and the jth component replaced by xj;
• if v(xi)+v(xj)>v(ys−1
i )+v(ys−1
j ), then ys is equal to ys−1 with the ith com-
ponent replaced by t and the jth component replaced by xj, where t is such
that ys−1
i < t < xi and v(xi) + v(xj) = v(t) + v(ys−1
j ) (t exists by continuity
and monotonicity);
• if v(xi) + v(xj)<v(ys−1
i ) + v(ys−1
j ), then ys is equal to ys−1 with the ith
component replaced by xi and the jth component replaced by t, where t
is such that xn < t < ys−1
j and v(x1) + v(xn) = v(ys−1
i ) + v(t) (t exists by
continuity and monotonicity).
Recall that we have to show that xP v y implies xP u y and that xI v y implies
xR u y. Because the vector y  constructed above differs in only one compo-
nent from x, and because of monotonicity and reﬂexivity, there are only three
possible cases: both xP v y  and xP u y , both xI v y  and xI u y , or both y  Pv x428 K. Bosmans
and y  Pu x. Hence, given transitivity, it is sufﬁcient to show that y  Iv y implies
y  Ru y. It is known from Pratt (1964) that if Ru is at least as Arrow–Pratt
inequality averse as Rv, then u = f ◦ v where the function f : R → R is strictly
increasing and concave. Consider an arbitrary step s = 1,2,...,m − 1i nt h e
algorithm given above. This step transforms ys−1 into ys by changing two of its
components, say ys−1
i and ys−1
j with i < j. Since no other components change,
ys−1 Iv ys is equivalent to v(ys−1
i ) + v(ys−1
j ) = v(ys
i) + v(ys
j) or v(ys−1








i ), we have
u(ys−1




we have ys−1 Ru ys for each step s = 1,2,...,m − 1. Hence, by transitivity, it
follows that y  Ru y.    
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